Learning objectives: After participating in this activity, learners should be better able to:
D
ementia is a clinical term for brain conditions, including many neurodegenerative diseases, characterized by the progressive loss of mental faculties, ultimately leading to an inability to care for oneself. 1 Alzheimer's disease is the most common form of dementia, although Lewy body dementia, Parkinson's disease dementia, vascular dementia, and frontotemporal dementia are also encountered. 1 Early in the disease course, these different types of dementia can impair specific cognitive processes, such as memory, language, behavior, or executive functions, but all types of dementia can impair decision making. 2 Impaired decision making can have important consequences when considering medical capacity assessments or the legal determination of competency in patients suffering from dementia. As the number of patients with dementia is expected to rise in the next several decades, 3 an understanding of how decision making becomes impaired in patients with dementia is necessary.
The study of decision making in neurological patients has often focused on deficits in reasoning and executive functions. Research into the neural basis of decision making has demonstrated, however, that many other neuropsychological processes contribute to decision making in various contexts, including those important for motivation related to reward and punishment 4 and for monitoring one's cognitive deficits, a process referred to as metacognition. 5, 6 Lawyers, judges, and even medical practitioners may not consider these less recognized components of decision making when assessing capacity in patients with dementia.
In this article, we review the neuropsychological processes contributing to decision making and how these processes are impaired in patients with dementia. Next, we describe the medical concept of capacity and legal definition of competency, which both involve a binary determination of a patient's ability to make specific types of decisions. We will discuss the current limitations in applying research in decision making toward these determinations, including the group-toindividual inference problem, the uncertain role of neuroimaging, and the need to develop additional tools integrating decision-making tasks with capacity assessments. Finally, we use case studies to examine how clinicians' assessments of impaired decision making might influence determinations of capacity and competency.
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION MAKING Executive Functions
Decision making is the process of selecting an appropriate action from a number of possible actions. 2, [7] [8] [9] Determining the appropriate course of action involves a number of different cognitive processes, including selecting one's goal, motivating to achieve this goal, weighing the likely consequences of different options, and determining which expected consequences would best fit with these goals. 7 This is not a static process: goals may shift at various points, as may the likelihood of different outcomes for selected actions. Finally, multiple goals may be present simultaneously, so that one must choose actions that fulfill some goals while also inhibiting decisions that maximize other competing goals. 7, 9 These abilities have been collectively referred to as executive functions. 10 Many models of executive functions have been proposed, including those focusing on selective attention, 11 working memory, 12 top-down modulation or control, 7,9 selection and execution of goal-directed behavior, 7 context-specific action-response memories, 13 or structured event complexes. 13 In each theory, the broader model of executive function can be further divided into specific processes that have been studied extensively. Proposed executive function processes have included, for example, the following: initiation, volition, and energization; working memory, selective attention, set shifting, task setting, and task maintenance; and response inhibition, monitoring, salience detection, and conflict control. 8 Energization involves the initiation and maintenance of goaldirected behavior. 8 Loss of initiation can result in clinical syndromes of apathy, abulia, and akinetic mutism. These syndromes cause a loss in goal-directed behavior, resulting in a failure to make decisions important to daily functioning. Maintenance is the ability to sustain goal-directed behavior over time. 8 This includes the concept of selective attention and vigilance 11 as well as control over conflicting, more automatic or default responses.
14 Task selection involves selecting the appropriate response to a stimulus given the individual's goals. 8 This process involves learning the appropriate response to a stimulus, shifting one's response when the task goal changes (set shifting), and inhibiting responses that are no longer appropriate (response inhibition). These processes are closely related to the concept of working memory, which involves the retrieval, holding, and manipulation of information necessary to aid in decision making. 12 Finally, monitoring refers to the process of checking for errors in task performance. 8 This process also involves reorienting attention to unexpected stimuli. 15, 16 Patients with impaired monitoring do not modify their behavior in response to inappropriate outcomes and may lose the ability to check internal expectations with external reality. Metacognition, a specific type of monitoring of one's cognitive deficits, will be discussed in a subsequent section.
Different types of executive functions may involve distinct brain networks. For instance, the frontoparietal or executive control network ( Figure 1A ) has been associated with executive functions and cognitive control, 17 the dorsal attention network ( Figure 1B ) with top-down modulation of attention, 18 and the ventral attention network ( Figure 1C ) with reorienting of attention and monitoring of performance. 18 Reward, Punishment, and Value The cognitive neuroscience of decision making has also revealed a complex network of brain networks involved in determining the expected reward or punishment associated with different choices. 19, 20 While initially described in decisions involving nonsocial, monetary rewards or punishments, more recent research suggests that computations involving social rewards and punishments involve a similar network of regions. 4 This process is sometimes referred to as modelfree learning, in the sense that it occurs automatically without explicit, conscious predictions of reward or punishment values. 21 The expected value for a given choice is thought to be associated with activity in the ventral tegmental area, nucleus accumbens ( Figure 1D ), and other portions of the ventral striatum. 4 This value is continuously updated by incorporating reward-prediction errors, or the amount that the actual rewarding experience differed from what was expected with the choice. Finally, regions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex are thought to integrate the expected values of many different possible choices in order to form a determination of the decision with the greatest expected reward value. 4, 19, 22 For particular choices this determination gives motivation weights, ultimately influencing decision making. 19 These determinations are particularly relevant to decisions involving a choice between safe and risky options, and to decisions where expected outcomes are ambiguous or uncertain. 2 Valuebased decision making involving punishment is conceptually similar but is subserved by a distinct neuroanatomical network that includes the anterior insula, anterior cingulate, and lateral striatum. 4 Several psychological tasks are designed to assess value-based decision making. Risk aversion asks subjects to choose between a guaranteed amount of money and a gamble to receive a potentially much larger sum of money. Temporal discounting tasks ask subjects to choose between a small sum of money now or a larger amount of money at a later time. Finally, the Iowa gambling task 23 tests ambiguous decision making, where subjects learn to choose from decks of cards that result in a net increase in money over time, as opposed to decks with higher potential immediate rewards but high potential losses, leading to a net loss of money over time.
Metacognition and Awareness of Deficits
Self-awareness of cognitive, emotional, and motivational limitations allows a patient to appropriately determine situations where decision making is likely to be impaired. This awareness of one's cognitive limitations is sometimes referred to as metacognition, and loss of this awareness in neurological patients is often called anosognosia. 5 Metacognition is an important practical skill that allows patients to adapt their behavior so that events where impaired decision making are likely occur less often. Metacognition can be assessed by comparing self-ratings versus caregiver ratings of cognitive abilities or by comparing self-ratings versus actual performance on cognitive testing. 6 Various tasks have been developed to measure components of metacognition, including ease of knowing, feeling of knowing, judgment of knowing, and retrospective confidence ratings. 5 Patients with most types of dementia, including Alzheimer's disease and frontotemporal dementia, have been shown to have impaired metacognition. 6 This type of impairment correlates with structural and functional brain abnormalities in parts of the frontal lobe important for monitoring task performance 24 and may particularly involve right frontal and right anterior insular regions. 25 Finally, loss of metacognition may relate to disrupted functional connectivity between these regions and the regions involved in memory or other cognitive abilities. 26 
MEDICAL AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF IMPAIRED DECISION MAKING
In the previous section, we discussed the various neuropsychological processes contributing to normal decision making and impaired decision making in dementia. In this section we apply that knowledge to better understand the enormous impact that impaired decision making can have on dementia patients, families, and society. For example, physical injuries may occur from impaired driving, use of dangerous tools, or weapons; poor financial decision making may lead to significant loss of wealth; and patients may be at risk of elder abuse and exploitation. Because of these concerns, measures are often taken to limit autonomy in patients with impaired decision making. Such interventions are not taken lightly, and it is therefore important to ensure that these determinations are made as accurately as possible. In the following sections on capacity, competency, and surrogate decision making, we discuss how determinations of impaired decision making are made, and highlight instances where decision-making research could help to inform these processes.
Capacity and Competency
Capacity refers to the functional determination of whether an individual patient has the ability to make a specific decision, such as financial decisions, or to perform a specific task, such as driving. 27 By contrast, competency is the legal determination of whether an impaired mental capacity limits a patient's ability to make a legally relevant decision or action. Physicians play an important role in this process: in most cases, capacity determinations are made in the clinic without adjudication, and even in cases that progress to legal hearings to determine competency, evidence from clinicians is often key. 28 Importantly, capacity is context-and decision-specific: a patient may retain the capacity for certain decisions even if the capacity for other types of decisions is lost. Research has largely focused on the capacity for informed consent. 29 In order to obtain informed consent, patients must demonstrate four capacities: to understand the information presented, to appreciate how this information relates to their personal situation, to rationally use this information to arrive at a decision, and to maintain a consistent choice over time. 29 The assessment tools that have been developed for determining capacity for informed consent use structured interviews 30 or examine a patient's ability to reason through hypothetical medical decision-making vignettes. [31] [32] [33] [34] For example, patients will be given a scenario involving different treatment options, and must use this information to choose a specific treatment. Their responses are rated according to their ability to articulate the expected benefits and side effects, to describe how these will affect them personally, to use this information to make a treatment choice, and to maintain a consistent choice over time. [31] [32] [33] [34] Impaired capacity for informed consent has also been shown to correlate with verbal fluency, 35 conceptual and confrontational naming, 36 and general cognitive screens using the Mini-Mental Status Examination. 30, 37 Finally, impaired metacognition has been associated with loss of capacity to consent. 38 Decline in capacity may occur in both Alzheimer's disease 39 and mild cognitive impairment, 40 making frequent reassessment of capacity necessary. The capacity for financial decision making can be defined as "the capacity to manage money and financial assets in ways which meet a person's needs and which are consistent with his/her values and self-interest." 41 The process can be assessed using structured tools targeting both procedural and decision-making aspects of financial management. 42 Capacity for financial decision making is associated with written arithmetic and executive-function task performance. 43, 44 Additionally, left angular gyrus atrophy has been associated with diminished financial capacity. 44 Neuropsychological risk factors for financial exploitation or financial abuse in persons with dementia have not been specifically addressed, although one factor (in addition to executive dysfunction) may be abnormal trust in strangers. 45 The clinician's role in financial capacity includes educating patients and families about financial planning, recognizing and screening for impaired financial capacity, recommending interventions to maintain financial independence, and making appropriate referrals when financial capacity is questioned. 46 Determining capacity in other contexts, such as voting 47, 48 and gun ownership, 49, 50 has been less standardized but follows the same logic as assessing capacity for informed consent and financial capacity.
Surrogate Decision Making
Identification of surrogate decision makers should be made early for patients at risk of developing impaired capacity. A health care proxy is a medical form used to appoint a surrogate decision maker for health care-related decisions, whereas a durable power of attorney can also assist in other types of legal and financial decisions. 51 In the event that a patient lacks the capacity to complete a health care proxy form or select a durable power of attorney, a lengthy legal process of appointing a guardian or conservator may be necessary. In other situations, the patient's nuclear family serves as a surrogate decision maker, given their unique knowledge of the patient's preferences, coupled with the common-law precedent of appointing family members as surrogate decision makers. 51 Surrogate decision makers should be counseled to make decisions that are consistent with a patient's expressed wishes, values, or preferences, and that are in the best interest of the patient. 51 
LIMITATIONS
In the previous sections, we have outlined the neuropsychological processes contributing to decision making, as well as the situations where impaired decision making can affect medical or legal determinations of capacity and competency. Advances in the cognitive neuroscience of decision making, however, have not significantly affected such determinations. In this section, we discuss three reasons for this shortfall:
(1) difficulty in determining how data regarding decision making at a population level affect judgments regarding an individual patient's decision-making capacity; (2) uncertainty whether neuroimaging data aid capacity determinations beyond behavioral data; and (3) lack of integration of measures of social cognition, value and reward, and metacognition into formal capacity-assessment tools.
Group-to-individual inference problem
Research in decision making uses the scientific method: experiments are conducted in a large number of subjects and statistically tested to determine commonalities at the group level. By contrast, capacity, whether in the medical or legal setting, involves determining whether an individual patient has impaired decision making specifically related to the question at hand. This discrepancy between scientific knowledge at the group level and applied science at the individual level has been called the group-to-individual (G2i) inference problem. 52 This problem is similar to those faced by clinicians every day, where diagnoses, treatments, and outcomes informed by clinical research at the group level must be applied to decisions regarding specific, individual patients. 53 Given this limitation, how might decision-making science influence determinations of capacity? Faigman and colleagues 52 suggest that such research can be used in two ways: to present general scientific evidence to educate jurors or other fact finders to help them either to understand important facets of a case (framework evidence) or to apply general scientific findings to make specific judgments in individual cases (diagnostic evidence). For example, evidence regarding the validity of eyewitness testimony is used to educate jurors regarding the limitations and biases of such accounts at the group level (framework evidence); the consensus, however, is that these researchers should not make judgments about the validity of eyewitness testimony in any specific case. 52 By contrast, a forensic psychiatrist may very well testify not only that persons with schizophrenia have impaired decision making but also that the individual patient in question has schizophrenia and has impaired decision making, or even that this impairment renders the patient legally insane. 53 It is unclear where decision-making evidence should fall along this spectrum. In some cases, the recognition that reward/punishment, emotions, social cognition, and metacognition contribute to decision making could be useful as framework evidence. The degree to which these psychological processes can be applied to a specific case, however, depends on the scientific validity of the measures in clinical populations and on how well these measures capture components that are relevant to the immediate medical or legal question of capacity. For example, one might be able to demonstrate impairment in reward processing in a clinical patient, but proving that this impairment contributed to a specific illegal action would require additional evidence demonstrating that reward processing was critically involved in that decision.
Utility of Neuroimaging Evidence
Capacity and competency are judgments based on mental states. 54 Behavioral testing can provide valuable information regarding whether impaired neuropsychological processes are compromising the mental states required for decisionmaking capacity. In many instances, neuroimaging research has identified specific brain regions involved in these neuropsychological processes. 55 A controversial question becomes whether using neuroimaging evidence to show abnormal functional brain activity could therefore add value in determining medical or legal capacity. 54, 56 Stephen Morse, 54 among others, has argued that in most cases, neuroimaging is unlikely to add value beyond behavioral data. Showing functional neuroimaging abnormalities in a given patient is irrelevant if this abnormality is not associated with behavioral differences in the patient; and if such behavioral differences exist, it is unclear that the neuroimaging evidence helps in determining capacity or competency. Additionally, neuroimaging findings are currently unable to aid in the clinical diagnosis of psychiatric diseases. In the case of persons with dementia, however, neuroimaging is part of routine clinical care and improves diagnostic accuracy. Current research definitions for Alzheimer's disease 57 and frontotemporal dementia, 58 for example, define typical behavioral syndromes as possible Alzheimer's disease or frontotemporal dementia, whereas the presence of neuroimaging abnormalities (amyloid PET scan in Alzheimer's disease, frontal or temporal abnormalities on MRI or PET for frontotemporal dementia) are necessary to diagnose probable dementia. As a patient's clinical diagnosis in dementia provides a potential causal explanation for a change in behavior, such evidence can provide additional value in specific cases. It is important to note, however, that even with a behavioral profile and neuroimaging consistent with a diagnosis of dementia, assessing a patient's decision making related to a specific action is still necessary for medical determinations of capacity and legal determinations of competency. 54 
Lack of Integration of Decision-Making Research with Formal Capacity Assessments
Finally, there is a lack of integration between tasks designed to test certain aspects of decision making, on the one hand, and tools designed specifically to assess for capacity to make specific types of decisions, on the other. 27 For example, reward and punishment may contribute to financial decision making, but tasks used to test these constructs in other settings may not translate well to the specific situation of financial decision making. Additionally, other processes, such as reasoning and planning, also contribute to these decisions, and the interaction between such domains may not be apparent when each domain is tested separately.
More ecologically valid measures designed to test capacity for financial decisions, however, may not assess the effects of reward and punishment on these decisions. There is therefore a critical need for decision-making science to inform the design of capacity measures to reflect the multiple neuropsychological processes contributing to these decisions. Preliminary work on financial decision making in the elderly is beginning to show how such integration might take place: changes in risk aversion and temporal discounting have been shown to occur with aging and to relate to financial decision making, 59 and susceptibility to scams is related to abnormal memory and processing speeds. 60 Using such information to further refine capacity-assessment tools is necessary in order to improve the applicability of behavioral assessments at the group level with abnormalities important for capacity at the individual level.
CASE STUDIES IN DEMENTIA, DECISION MAKING, AND THE LAW
Impaired executive functions, reward-based valuation, social cognition, emotion, and metacognition can all be present in patients with dementia, leading to deficits in decision making. These deficits can lead to an inability to make legal, financial, and medical decisions effectively, and present the potential for financial exploitation and abuse. In the following section, we present a series of hypothetical cases where issues of capacity and competency arise in patients with dementia and impaired decision making. In each case, we will discuss how clinical, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging evidence is or is not useful in determining capacity or competency.
Case 1: Parkinson's Disease with Impulse Control Disorder A 68-year-old man with Parkinson's disease for the past seven years has recently been started on a dopamine agonist. In the last three months, he has begun gambling excessively and soliciting prostitutes, losing nearly $100,000 dollars from his savings. He is now estranged from his wife and living with a friend, but is on the verge of losing his housing as he recently started using cocaine. He has now been summoned to court by his debtors.
Impulse control disorders (ICDs) are increasingly recognized to occur in patients with Parkinson's disease. 61 These behaviors include pathological gambling, addiction, sexual behaviors, and binge eating. Unmedicated patients with Parkinson's disease do not have an increased incidence of ICD compared to healthy controls. 62 However, once started on medications, up to 25% of medicated patients will develop ICDs. 63 ICDs are more common in patients being treated with dopamine agonists than with other medicines for Parkinson's disease, 64 and up to 39% of patients started on a dopamine agonist will develop ICDs. 65 An important question is whether impulsive ICDs result from loss of executive functions or from alterations in valuebased decision making. Parkinson's patients with ICDs given dopamine agonists performed worse than patients without ICDs on a delayed-discounting task, which involves valuebased decision making, but performed within the normal range on tests of executive function. 66, 67 In fact, Parkinson's patients with ICDs generally perform better than patients without ICDs on tests of executive function. 68 Impaired delayed discounting appears to be due to undervaluing future rewards rather than to increasing the perceived value of immediate rewards, 69 and risky behavior in ICD patients is higher due to the potential gains rather than to decreased loss aversion. 70 The patient in Case 1 presented to his neurologist for evaluation. He had a tremor in his left hand at rest and with walking that improved with action. His facial expression was masked, and his blink rate was reduced. He had bradykinesia and rigidity in his left-greater-than-right arm and leg, difficulty rising from a chair, and festinating gait. He performed normally on bedside cognitive testing, although he would often start a cognitive test before the instructions had been fully explained. On behavioral interview he expressed remorse and guilt about his behavior but felt an inability to control himself. A dopamine transporter PET scan (Figure 2) showed reduced dopamine transporter uptake in the basal ganglia, consistent with a diagnosis of Parkinson's disease.
On neuropsychological testing the patient demonstrated impaired delayed discounting, but performed normally on tests of executive function. After stopping his dopamine agonist medication, he no longer felt the urge to gamble, solicit prostitutes, or use drugs. His neuropsychological testing was repeated, and he no longer showed evidence of impaired delayed discounting.
In pretrial hearings, the neurologist testified that the patient's history and examination findings were consistent with a diagnosis of Parkinson's disease. His dopamine transporter scan was not felt to significantly change the confidence of this diagnosis and was not presented at the hearing. His history of behavioral changes and impaired delayed discounting while on a dopamine agonist, coupled with the resolution of this behavior and neuropsychological change on cessation of the medication, was argued to provide causal evidence for dopamine-induced ICD. After hearing the neurologist's testimony, his debtors agreed to drop all criminal charges on the condition that the patient pay back, over time, the money that was owed.
Case 2: Alzheimer's Disease and Financial Capacity A 73-year-old man with mild dementia came in for clinical follow-up with his daughter. Previously, he had stopped working as a salesperson because of his dementia and stopped driving because of cataracts, but had no other impairment in his activities of daily living. His daughter expressed concern about his ability to maintain his finances. He missed paying several bills in the last three months. Moreover, when out to dinner last week, he had significant difficulty paying the bill. He recently invested in a dubious real-estate venture after talking with a telemarketer on the phone. When confronted, he denies any problems with his ability to manage his finances.
In the above case, the patient presented to neurology clinic, where he was found to have significantly impaired short-term memory. He could perform only one calculation correctly on serial 7s and had difficulty copying a cube. At the end of the interview, he asked several questions again that had been answered near the beginning of the interview. On behavioral interview, he could not reason through common financial situations, although he lacked an awareness of this impairment. An FDG-PET scan (Figure 3) showed hypometabolism of the parietal and temporal lobes, consistent with a diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease.
On more formal neuropsychological testing, the patient had mild executive function deficits and also specific deficits in arithmetic. He performed poorly on a financial-capacity task and demonstrated little awareness of his deficits. He was able to express a preference for his daughter to be his durable power of attorney and health care proxy, and clearly described what that and other potential alternatives entailed.
The patient's physician determined that his history, examination findings, and neuroimaging changes were consistent with a diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease. The patient had abnormalities on examination and neuropsychological testing that impaired his ability to make financial decisions, including poor memory, impaired calculations, and impaired reasoning. Moreover, he had deficits in metacognition that prevented him from recognizing his impairments. Finally, he was found to be impaired on a formal financial-capacity task. His neurologist therefore determined that he lacked the capacity to make financial decisions.
Given the above, the patient would need a surrogate decisionmaker to help with financial decisions. Despite the aforementioned impairments in decision making, the patient was able to demonstrate an understanding of what a surrogate decision maker would do, to select his daughter (a reasonable choice as his closest family member who was actively involved in his care), and to consistently maintain that decision over time. His neurologist therefore determined that he did have decision-making capacity to complete a health care proxy form and to name his daughter as his durable power of attorney.
CONCLUSIONS
Classically, the law has assessed subjects' capacities for decision making based on their ability to reason through potential consequences of, and alternatives to, their prospective choices. Research has revealed, however, that decision making is a complex process that depends on multiple different executive functions, value-based predictions of reward and punishment, and metacognition (see Text Box 1). Moreover, different types of choices will involve these processes to varying degrees. Classic neuropsychological tests of the traditional cognitive domains, such as language, memory, and executive functions, may not closely align with the processes necessary to make important types of decisions. Tasks probing other neuropsychological processes should therefore be incorporated into evaluations of persons with dementia when assessing decision-making capacity.
Specific assessments of capacity can increase the ecological validity of behavioral evidence used to determine capacity. Examples include financial-capacity assessments 41, 42 and informed consent vignettes. [31] [32] [33] [34] Such measures would benefit, however, from including aspects of value-based decision making and metacognition. Moreover, it is unclear whether measures of moral decision making, 71 which may be more ecologically valid, would be useful in arguing for diminished capacity in competency cases; more research is needed to determine whether such an association is valid.
Finally, neuroimaging is currently of little added value beyond behavioral data in determining capacity and competency. 54 The one exception worth noting is that neuroimaging can improve diagnostic accuracy for specific types of dementia, which can be useful in determining a causal etiology for behavioral changes. It is unclear whether neuroimaging will have further utility in such matters in the future.
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